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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 18/05/2006

Accident number: 194

Accident time: 14:00

Accident Date: 27/01/1994

Where it occurred: Bosknor - Chey Mean
Chey, Banan District,
Battambang province
Primary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)
Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: NS (date inferred)

Country: Cambodia

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: 29/01/1994
Name of source: CMAC/MAG

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: Type 72 AP blast

Ground condition: metal fragments

Date record created: 14/02/2004

Date last modified: 14/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: GR: 9320 2330

Coordinates fixed by: GPS

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate equipment (?)
inadequate metal-detector (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
safety distances ignored (?)

Accident report
At the time of the accident the demining group were using a two-man drill. In this, one
deminer uses the detector and marks any signals. A second deminer checks for tripwires,
cuts undergrowth and investigates any detector readings.
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An internal demining group accident report was written by their "Senior Specialist" after a site
visit on 28th January 1994. The report was found at file at the country MAC in January 1999.
The following details of the accident are drawn from the statements of the victim's supervisor
and partner because the report author provided no summary of events.
At the time of the accident the victim was wearing boots, helmet and jacket and was retrieving
his "goggles and scissors" from an area believed safe. [The group's "goggles" were in fact
safety spectacles and "scissors" were shears.]
After a "smoke break" the Supervisor went to the victim's lane to check the work. He used
their detector which signalled and the tip of a bullet and two Type 72a mines were discovered.
[It is unclear whether this was in an area they had declared clear or not: if not, he was
checking the detector rather than their work.]
The supervisor began to suspect that the detector was faulty but continued and the detector
gave a low whistle. He prodded the suspect area and excavated by hand but found nothing.
He then signalled to the expatriate Specialist to come and destroy the finds.
When the expatriate arrived the deminers went into the lane to get their equipment. The victim
was going to fetch "scissors and goggles". As they returned with their equipment the victim,
who was three metres behind his partner, stood on a Type 72a mine.

Conclusion
The investigator concluded that the Schiebel AN 19/2 detector in use would locate a Type 72a
under normal operating conditions, but had failed to detect a Type 72a just prior to the
accident.
The detector used was tested and found to be faulty. It passed the Schiebel set-up test but
then failed to signal on a test Type 72a mine that gave readings to other detectors. The faulty
detector was passed to the country MAC for examination.

Recommendations
The investigator recommended that all Schiebel detectors should be held in stores until
checked by the manufacturer. Also that, due to the "anti-handling nature" of the Type 72a [this
mine does not include an anti-handling device – the Type 72b does] and the "hard, dry
ground conditions" prodding was too dangerous, so all the group's demining operations in
Cambodia should cease until the problem was resolved.

Victim Report
Victim number: 247

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 1 hour

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: Frag jacket

Helmet
Short visor
Summary of injuries:
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Below knee
COMMENT
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No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Inadequate equipment” because of the
detector failure. The secondary cause is listed as “Field control inadequacy" because the
victim trod on a mine that would have been found if appropriate field controls had been in
place and if the detector inadequacy had been recognised in a timely manner.
Given that six detectors had failed similarly [see Related papers], the problem should have
been addressed before an accident occurred.

Related papers
A report on detector failure was prepared by the country MAC by an expatriate Technical
Advisor. Dated 28th January 1994, it concluded that the detector was "prone to intermittent
failure", and that the "fault has been identified to be with the cable from the search head to the
box, with the join at the box being the location of the problem". The cable did not look faulty
and the detector passed the standard tuning SOP. It detected a Type 72a on several
occasions, was retuned, tested and retuned again. After the third retuning it was not able to
detect the test mine and made an intermittent noise.
The author felt that "there is a major problem with the detectors, and that their effectiveness
and reliability is in serious doubt." He recommended that all detectors be withdrawn from
operations until Schiebel themselves subjected the detectors to electronic tests.
The demining group involved in the accident produced a brief report stating that they had six
detectors with search head connection to control box faults. They had sent "at least 10"
others back to the manufacturer in the past. The current faults were first brought to the
attention of the Schiebel Sales representative in mid-December 1993.
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